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Collaborative processes for working toward common management goals between individuals and
organizations, despite their differences, emerged as one enduring legacy resulting from the Timber
Wars in the American West during the late-1980s and the early 1990s. Power imbalances are often
cited as a common problem in collaborative processes and can have a lasting, deleterious impact
on the collaborative process and its outcomes. For all its importance, however, there is a yet unfulfilled need to understand the extent to which power and power imbalances affect collaborative
relationships. Our research uses a case study approach to qualitatively analyze power dynamics
within three collaborative efforts comprised of the United States Forest Service and community
stakeholders. We identified four sources of power in play within the three case studies examined
to include authority, resources, discursive legitimacy, and trust. We also discuss the application
of these power sources and the ensuing outcomes. These powers, and the imbalance that sometimes
result from their application, are representative of some of the underlying tensions that can be
present in collaborative processes.
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T

he Timber Wars in the
American West during the
late-1980s and the early
1990s left in their wake
many enduring legacies including the emergence of collaborative processes among individuals and organizations
who work towards common management
goals, despite their differences (Baker and
Kusel 2003). While this emergent form of social relations has attracted attention from policy-makers, federal forest stakeholders, and
researchers, power imbalances are cited as a
common problem in collaborative governance arrangements and can have a lasting,
deleterious impact on the collaborative process and its outcomes (Gray 1989). Power
imbalances can occur as the result of stronger
parties manipulating other parties within the

collaboration. Government agencies are often
in the position to invite community stakeholders into the collaborative process while,
at the same time, being actors in the process
themselves. This leads to concerns that
agency personnel may opt to dominate the
process by including or excluding certain
stakeholders. This dominating behavior may
also be exhibited by non-governmental members of the collaboration (Lukes 1975; Singleton 2002; Walker and Hurley 2004). Additionally, if stakeholders, including agencies, do not have power in terms of voice, resources, or legitimacy, they risk being coopted by more powerful stakeholders within
the collaborative arrangement (Coggins
1999; McCloskey 1996; Purdy 2012).
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For all its importance, however, there
is a yet unfulfilled need to understand the extent to which power and power imbalances
affect collaborative relationships (Cook
2015; Purdy 2012). Despite the integral role
that power-sharing plays in collaborative
governance, relatively few empirical studies
have been dedicated to understanding the role
of power in natural resource management at
the field level (Raik, Wilson and Decker
2008). Our study contributes to the empirical
analysis of the role of power in collaborative
governance arrangements by examining the
attributes of power at play in three case studies of collaborative national forest management processes involving the US Department
of Agriculture’s Forest Service (USFS) and
locally-based stakeholders. In this study, we
used three research questions to guide our inquiry: 1) What are the sources of power at
play in the USFS – community collaboration
interactions? 2) How is power being applied
in the USFS – community collaboration interactions? 3) What are the outcomes of the
application of power and what are the consequences for the USFS’s organizational structures and processes?
Background
The Promise of Collaborative Governance
Over the past three decades, collaborative
governance has come to the fore as a way to
address natural resource management problems that are often complex and contentious
(Cestero 1999; Dukes 2001; Scardina, Mortimer and Dudley 2007; Singleton 2002).
These collaborative efforts have been created
in response to the inability of any single entity to address the interconnected ecological,
economic, and social complexities arising
from resource management and as a method
of answering the public’s demand to be more
involved in making decisions about the man-

agement activities on public lands. Additionally, as budgets are stretched and human resources constrained in natural resource management agencies, collaborative governance
arrangements have been touted as an important avenue for getting on-the-groundwork completed, particularly in the areas of
forest planning and forest restoration (Carr,
Selin and Schuett 1998; Cheng and Burns
2007; Leach, Pelkey and Sabatier 2002; Selin
and Chevez 1995; Selin, Schuett and Carr
1997). Collaboration with community
groups, particularly in the western United
States, has also proliferated as a way to address threats to life, property, and infrastructure from wildfires (Jakes et al. 2011). As our
unit of study in this research, we examine
three collaborative groups, composed of the
United States Forest Service and community
stakeholders, formed for the purpose of enhancing forest restoration activities.
Power Defined
Robert Dahl (1957) in his seminal work, The
Concept of Power notes that most people
have an intuitive sense of what power means,
yet scientists have struggled to articulate its
precise meaning. A review of the social science and collaborative governance literature
proves that a mutual definition remains elusive (Cook 2015; Shively 2011; Gerlak,
Heikkila and Lubell et al. 2013). Kanter
(1992:46) writes that power “is a function of
formal authority, resources controlled, and
contingencies managed.” Agrawal and Ribot
(1999) define power as the authority to create
rules and make decisions. Egan, Hjerpe and
Abrams (2011) refer to three phases of
power; the ability to control the behavior of
others or the ‘power over,’ the ability to authorize the participation of stakeholders who
might otherwise be marginalized or the
‘power for,’ and the ‘power to’ which he defines as the ability to measure another entity’s
ability to realize its goals. In its simplest
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form, power refers to the influence one person or group has over the other (Weber
1922). We apply Weber’s (1922) definition
here to collaborative governance. As such,
power can be thought of as the desire and
ability of a subset of the members of a collaborative group to influence the decision made
on behalf of the group as a whole.
Power in Collaborative Governance
Collaboration, by its very nature and definition, involves some level of shared power
(Armitage 2005). However, if power is not
shared equally among all collaborative group
members, it has the ability to prevent equitable relationships from emerging or transform
symmetrical collaborative networks into
asymmetrical decision-making bodies with
the potential to further strain already tenuous
relationships. The distribution of power
across actors involved in collaboration can
affect how problems in resource management
are defined and solutions are ultimately implemented (Sturtevant and Donoghue 2008).
Despite its critical importance, analyzing
power in collaborative processes is challenging, not only because of its inherent complexity, but as Purdy (2012:410) states, “because
they [collaborative processes] are ambiguous, complex contexts in which participants,
social structures, and processes can change
rapidly.” In this study, we examine power
and ensuing power dynamics through the examination of three observable attributes that
constitutes power: the sources of power, the
application of power, and the consequences
and outcomes resulting from the application
of power.
Sources of Power
We borrow from Purdy (2012), three sources
of power within collaborative governance

processes; authority, resources, and discursive legitimacy, and include a fourth source,
trust, into our analysis.
Congress confers broad authority directly to the USFS through the agency’s statutory mission and mandates, along with substantive and procedural limitations to that
power (Coggins 1999; Nie 2004). On the one
hand, these congressional mandates are
vague, thereby vesting USFS administrators
with a high degree of discretion over major
decisions, from rulemaking to project-level
decision-making. On the other hand, these
same mandates provide substantive opportunities for public participation in agency decision processes. Stakeholders often seek to
limit an agency’s authority and discretion by
imposing their values and views on the decision-making process; agencies must then negotiate their discretionary authority with
stakeholders, effectively defining their ‘decision space,’ which, over time, can lead to an
imbalance of power between agency and
community stakeholders (Coggins 1999; Nie
2004). The public also gains authoritative
power through litigation and administrative
appeals.
Resource-based power is recognized
when those organizations that hold important
and valuable resources wield that power to
their advantage (Purdy 2012). As Purdy
(2012:410) states, resources can include such
tangibles as: “financial resources, people,
technology, and supplies; and intangibles
such as knowledge, culture, and capabilities.”
Expertise, knowledge and information are intimately linked, where the resource-based
power of expertise lies in the accumulation
and acquisition of a specific body of
knowledge through formal academic training
or job experience (Greiner and Schein 1988).
Weber’s (1958) classic research suggests that
the element of expertise is indeed, the bureaucracy’s primary source of power. It is important to note, however, that these resources,
and the power they connote, are not limited
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to the agency; other parties within the collaborative group can bring these resources to the
table and use them to assert their power (Gray
1985).
Discursive legitimacy refers to a
source of power that can be amassed when an
organization has the ability to speak on behalf
of the public it serves and advances a public
discourse on issues of importance and manages the meaning related to the issues (Hardy
and Phillips 1998). Purdy (2012:411) writes,
“Organizations exercise discursive legitimacy when they act on behalf of the values
or norms of society, such as the rule of law,
the logic of economic rationality, or principles such as democracy or respect for diverse
cultures. An organization with discursive legitimacy draws its power from the status of
the values or logic it represents.”
Trust is an often overlooked source of
power in the collaborative governance literature as it is most often intertwined with other
power sources; however, trust is at the foundation of many public natural resource planning processes and is a key determinant in
shaping planning outcomes (Lachapelle,
McCool and Patterson 2003). It stands to reason that community-agency relations would
be heavily based on trust, especially when negotiating the collaborative decision-space;
per Nie’s (2004) analysis, agencies which enjoy a high level of trust on the part of public
stakeholders are more likely to be granted a
greater degree of discretion. Smith et al.
(2012) describe four dimensions of trust involved in community-agency relations: 1)
dispositional trust; 2) trust in the federal government; 3) shared values; and 4) moral and
technical competencies. Dispositional trust
refers to an individual’s propensity to trust or
distrust others. Smith et al. (2013:454) comment that dispositional trust is generally a stable personality characteristic attributable to
“early-life social interactions.” Trust in the
federal government stems from an individual’s “level of confidence in the ability of the

federal government to carry out its fiduciary
responsibilities” (Smith et al. 2013:454) and
this level of confidence translates to the level
of trust an individual extends to a management agency. A belief that a resource management agency shares an individual’s values
and holds the same perspectives, opinions,
and desired outcomes of resource management portends that individual’s trust in the
agency. Finally, the trust that an agency will
do what it is expected and obligated to do relies on several factors relating to moral and
technical competencies. Smith et al.
(2013:455) suggest that for trust to exist in
the agency-community relationship, “there
must be some expectation on the part of the
trustor (e.g., local community member) that
the trustee (e.g. management agency) will adhere to moral codes, show respect for the
trustor’s values, and be technically capable
and able to perform specific tasks that yield
benefits for the trustor.”
Application of Power
Purdy (2012) provides a framework for assessing power in collaborative governance
processes by examining how three sources of
power – authority, resources, and discursive
legitimacy – are applied in three separate arenas: the participation arena, the process design arena, and the content arena. The participant arena considers who the participants
and leaders will be in the collaboration process. Purdy (2012:411) notes that participants
need to include those “with formal power to
make a decision, those affected by a decision,
and those with relevant information or expertise.” Those who possess the power of authority can apply their power by determining
who will be invited to participate in the collaboration process and what range of interests
the participants represent. The power of resources, when applied in the participation
arena, can influence how deeply participants
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engage in the collaborative process by influencing the number of people to be involved
and level of information and expertise
brought to the collaboration. Discursive legitimacy is applied when judgment is passed regarding who deserves to be involved in the
collaboration and who can be trusted to follow through on commitments made on behalf
of the organizations that the participants represent (Purdy 2012).
The second arena in which power can
be applied, according to Purdy (2012), is the
process design arena. Process design occurs
prior to the formation of the goals of the collaboration and determines the “where, when,
and how” of the collaborative process
(2012:411). Purdy (2012), following Straus
(2002), stresses that the process design must
be adaptable to allow for trial and error as the
collaborative process proceeds. Authority is
applied when participants feel they ‘own’ the
process and have a right to impose their expectations about how the process will unfold
and the degree to which other participants
will be active during deliberations and negotiations. The availability of resources has the
ability to shape the collaborative process by
facilitating or limiting factors such as meeting location and frequency, access to technology, and other costs associated with meeting
hosting and attendance. Those holding the
greater amount of power derived from discursive legitimacy “can lead to domineering behavior and one-way flows of information”
(Purdy 2012:411). Discursive legitimacy can
also be applied as a gatekeeping function and
can aid in determining the status of other participants and how and with whom the collaborative process is discussed (Purdy 2012).
The final arena in which Purdy (2012)
suggests that power is applied is the content
arena. Applying power in this arena determines the issues that the collaborative effort
will address, and which desired outcomes
will be pursued. As Purdy (2012:412) writes,
“authority allows an organization to set the

agenda and establish other participants’ expectation regarding the outcome of the process.” The participants who hold the power of
resources have the ability to control avenues
of communication such as meeting documentation, which, in turn, as Purdy (2012) suggests, might influence future meetings. Discursive legitimacy is applied in the content
arena when participants attempt to influence
the prioritization of issues and how those issues are framed (Purdy 2012).
The Consequences and Outcomes of the Application of Power
For all its promise of beneficial outcomes,
collaborative governance is not without its
pitfalls. Purdy (2012:409) notes that many of
the pitfalls of collaboration can be “linked to
power disparities among participating organizations and how power affects such issues as
representation, participation, and voice.” A
review of the collaborative governance literature indeed shows that a jockeying for
power is common in collaboration processes
(Gray 1989; Short and Winter 1999; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Tett, Crowther
and O'Hara 2003). Inconsistent expectations
of the collaborative process and lack of commitment of necessary resources have been labeled as obstacles that can impede, if not derail, collaborative efforts (Moote and Becker
2003; Walker and Hurley 2004). Critical interests may not be adequately represented
(Leach 2006) and negotiations that seek to
balance private interests with public authority
are not always successful (Walker and Hurley 2004). Power differences between the
parties can heighten conflict and often result
in a depletion of human resources as well as
the potential to harm the very resources
which the collaboration was trying to protect
(Buckles and Rusnak 1999). A lack of trust
between agencies and stakeholders (Davenport, Leahy, Anderson et al. 2007; Leach
2006; Schuett, Selin and Carr 2001) and an
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unwillingness to compromise on strongly
held, value-based positions often result in difficult and sometimes unsuccessful collaborative efforts (Donoghue and Sturtevant 2008).
At its best, power can be used to level the
playing field, giving all participants of a collaborative group equal representation (Purdy
2012). At its worst, power imbalances can
create scenarios in which the more powerful
stakeholders can co-opt the process and in
some cases “capture” the agency with whom
they are collaborating (Seidenfeld 2000; Singleton 2000).
Despite collaboration’s importance
and proliferation, there is a need for more research on the role of power in those processes
(Cook 2015). This gap in the collaborative
literature is especially troublesome in the
face of the potential deleterious consequences such as co-option and agency capture (Ansell and Gash 2008; Cook 2015; Imperial 2005; Purdy 2012). This study aims to
address this gap in the literature.
Methods
Case Study Approach
Three case studies encompassing the USFS
and community collaborative efforts were selected as units of study. The three collaborative groups were selected because they were
similar in purpose, with each group working
with their respective national forests on forest
restoration issues in the aftermath of timber
management conflicts (Table 1). The focus
was on the ranger district and supervisor office levels of the USFS in each case study. To
protect the anonymity of interviewees, we
use pseudonyms for each of the collaborative
groups and the national forests. The three
case studies that were chosen as units of analysis were: 1) The Northmont Forest Restoration Coalition (NFRC) – USFS Region 6; 2)
The Lone Mountain Forest Restoration Collaborative (LMFRC) – USFS Region 4; and

3) The Meadow Valley Forest Collaborative
(MVFC) – USFS Region 2.
The NFRC collaborates with the Bear
Valley National Forest (Bear Valley) in the
northwest region of the United States and is
the oldest collaborative effort among the
three case studies. The community in which
the ranger district and supervisor offices under study reside has a population of just below 5,000 people and most employment in
the area relies on the timber, agriculture and
mining industries, along with state and national government offices. The timber industry in the area has experienced dramatic
changes in production from federal forests,
and the region figured prominently in the
Timber Wars; the relationship between the
timber industry and environmental groups
has been a contentious one and the area has a
long history of conflict between the two entities. The NFRC was founded in 2002 for the
purposes of ameliorating this conflict and for
improving forest health through restoration
practices, protecting the community from
wildfire, and creating community economic
viability. At the time of this study, the NFRC
consisted predominately of representatives
from the industry and conservation interests.
In 2003, the NFRC and the Bear Valley formalized their working relationship by signing
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).
While the wounds that came out of the Timber Wars are still observable today, the
NFRC and the Bear Valley have collaborated
on over 25 forest management projects as of
the date of this research, ranging from stewardship contracting to forest planning.
The LMFRC was formed in July 2006
and collaborates with the River Point National Forest (River Point) in the intermountain west region of the United States; it represents a ‘middle-aged’ case study. The community in which the USFS offices reside has
a population of just over 3,000. The area’s
current economy is based chiefly on ranching

HJSR ISSUE 40 (2018)

Table 1. Summary of Characteristics of Case Studies
Group name
(Pseudonyms)

USFS
region

Group mission/focus

Years active

Type of participants

Northmont Forest
Restoration Coalition (NFRC)

6

Demonstrate the full
potential of restoration forestry to enhance forest health,
public safety, and
community economic vitality.

2002 - Present

USFS agency representatives, timber industry, environmental community

Lone Mountain
Forest Restoration
Collaborative
(LMFRC)

4

Enhance forest
2006 - Prehealth and local
sent
economies in the
county through stewardship contracting
and restoration activities

USFS and other federal
agency representatives,
landowners, timber industry, environmental community, community leaders, non-federal government representatives

Memorandum of
Understanding

Meadow Valley
Forest Collaborative (MVFC)

2

Use collaborative
2010 - Preapproaches to imsent
prove the health and
long-term resilience
of mixed-conifer forests and the communities located near
them.

USFS agency representatives, landowners, timber
industry, environmental
community, scientists,
community leaders,
elected officials, non-federal government representatives

No formal agreement at the time
data were collected

with some minor logging and mining operations. Until the mid-1990s, the area was home
to several small, locally-owned sawmills, log
home manufactures, post-and-pole operations, and commercial firewood businesses
which provided employment for the community’s citizens. Mill closures in the late 1980s
and early 1990s cost the local economy 250
jobs. Today, the remaining forest product
businesses lack the capacity to process
enough timber to make a large contribution to
the area’s economy. Recreation and tourism
are now the major contributors to the area’s
financial resources. Prior to the formation of
the LMFRC, the River Point was mired in
gridlock, facing appeals and litigation over

Formality of
agreements with
the USFS
Memorandum of
Understanding and
‘Collaborative
Work Plan’ (a
pseudonym)

forest management issues from protecting
old-growth stands to firewood sales. Today
the LMFRC is a self-governed group comprised of landowners, timber industry representatives, retired USFS personnel, the environmental community, non-federal government entities, and community leaders. The
LMFRC, through an MOU between the River
Point and the collaborative group, works to
restore the forest to a condition that mimics
the historic range of variability in terms of
stand structure, composition, and disturbance
regimes. At the time of this writing, the group
had completed one major restoration project
with two more slated as future activities.
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The MVFC is the most newly formed
of the collaborative efforts studied, with inauguration in the fall of 2010. The MVFC
works collaboratively with the Sunset Ridge
National Forest (Sunset) in the Rocky Mountain Region of the United States. The community in this case study has a population of
approximately 1,700 people. The area experienced intensive, albeit short-lived, logging
between 1890 and 1945. By the 1970s, a
dwindling supply of large-diameter trees
spelled the end of major logging operations
in the area; administrative appeals and citizen
lawsuits of timber projects hastened the decline of commercial timber harvesting in the
area. Today, the forest provides recreational
and aesthetic benefits to the community’s citizens, many of whom have taken an interest
in forest health issues on the Sunset. The
MVFC was established to include stakeholders’ perspectives and to collaboratively develop science-based forest management priorities. One of the group’s early successes
was the award of a long-term stewardship
contract in June of 2012.
Data Collection and Analysis
Data were collected between March and August 2012 using qualitative social science research methods encompassing semi-structured individual interviews and participant
observation of group meetings. Written reports created by the collaborative groups,
meeting minutes, and official collaboration
documents, such as MOUs were also collected. The intent of adding these documents
to the analysis was to enhance the reliability
of results by data triangulation (Golafshani
2003). We conducted twenty-six semi-structured, open-ended interviews across the three
cases. Of the twenty-six interviews, 16 were
with agency personnel (staff and line officers) and 10 were with community stakeholders. Line officers encompass district rangers

as well as forest supervisors. We chose interview respondents by both purposive and network sampling (Granovetter 1976). A key informant from each stakeholder group was determined based on professional relationships
with the authors. These key stakeholders
were contacted and they, in turn, provided a
list of other group members. Similarly, we
identified the key USFS contact in each
group (e.g. line officer, planner, or resource
specialist) and they provided us with a list of
potential USFS interviewees. All identified
persons were contacted via email or telephone. In all three case studies, we timed our
field visits to coincide with collaborative
group meetings, which we attended. Interview notes were transcribed verbatim into a
text format for content analysis and coding.
Accuracy of interview data was verified by
sending transcripts to each respective interviewee. Changes were made to the final transcripts based on interviewee comments and
clarifications.
We conducted a content analysis via
coding and constant comparison for 26 interviews and all generated and collected documentation employing a modified grounded
theory approach (Strauss and Corbin 1990).
We modified the coding process as described
by grounded theory in that, in addition to
identifying emergent codes, we developed a
priori codes based on the sensitizing concepts derived from the literature and structurally-driven codes that were derived from our
research goals and questions (DeCuir-Gunby,
Marshall and McCulloch 2011).
Findings
In this section, we present the dominant
storylines developed from the data, represented as the sources of power and their application and the associated outcomes. Selected quotations from interviewees are presented. Evidence obtained from documenta-
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tion such as meeting minutes, agreements between the USFS and the collaborative groups,
and personal observation notes are also presented. We use non-identifying means when
presenting quotations to protect the anonymity of participants. The analysis of the 26 interviews revealed four sources of power in
play within the three case studies examined:
1) authority; 2) resources; 3) discursive legitimacy; and 4) trust. We use Purdy’s (2012)
framework for assessing collaborative power,
with the addition of trust (Smith, Leahy,
Anderson et al. 2013), to organize our data.
Below we provide a summary these findings.
Power of Authority
Evidence of the power of authority was found
in all three cases with the NFRC providing
the strongest evidence of shifting power dynamics with seven of the 10 quotations coming from that group. In the participant arena,
the LMFRC and the MVFC had representation from a broad spectrum of interests and
perspectives and were open to including new
members. For example, the LMFRC includes
representatives from: local outfitters, state
fish and game, timber industry, conservation
organizations, and Bureau of Land Management. The range of stakeholder interests represented in the NFRC was narrower, involving only the agency and timber industry and
conservation organization representatives.
One line officer from the NFRC spoke about
the need to include other stakeholders and
commented, “I think there is an opportunity
to make this less of an insular collaborative
group so that there is more representation,
more voices.”
Leadership is also an important mechanism for applying the power of authority in
the participant arena and the application of
leadership was varied across the three case
studies. In the MVFC the line officer that
works with the collaborative group is clear
about the agency’s role in decision-making

and claims his leadership authority when
working with the group. He states,
I chose to be very clear with the [collaborative group] that the Forest Service is the ultimate decision-maker,
and that it was not their role to be decision-makers. It was to understand
how the Forest Service gets to a decision.
No participants from the LMFRC mentioned
leadership in the context of the application of
the power of authority during the interviews,
however, their MOU clearly defines the limits of the collaborative group by asserting that
the agency is the ultimate decision-maker.
The MOU states, “the USFS shall: Make all
decisions or determinations for National Forest Systems lands.”
In stark contrast to the LMFRC and
the MVFC, six interviewees from the NFRC
made comments that suggest the USFS line
officers were relinquishing some authority to
the collaborative group. The way leadership
was applied had consequences in the process
arena where some participants felt that they
had the right to impose their expectations on
the group as a whole. It was not uncommon
for USFS participants to use language such
as, “the [collaborative group] are always saying things like we will ‘allow’ you to do this
or that.”
In the content arena, the analysis of
the NFRC yielded evidence that the nonagency members of the collaborative group
were defining the group’s agenda and expectations of outcomes through the group’s Collaborative Agreement Acceptance Framework – a pseudonym (CAAF) for collaborative action. The CAAF details what the
NFRC calls a ‘holistic management strategy’
and was first drafted through a multi-stakeholder processes with foresters, scientists,
conservation groups, USFS, the state depart-
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ment of natural resource, and forest practitioners, recreation and tribal interests. Despite the fact that the CAAF was developed
through a multi-stakeholder process, its application is for use only by the collaborative
group members and the USFS. The CAAF
was in effect during the time of this research
and was considered by the collaborative
group, including the USFS, as the basis for
negotiated decision space in determining forest management allocations. There is an implied understanding between the collaborative group and the USFS that if the guidelines
of the CAAF are followed, the collaborative
group will not file objections to those decisions. However, during an informal conversation with one line officer, we were told that
the collaborative group was planning to file
an objection to an action that the USFS considered in alignment with the CAAF. The
outcome from working with the CAAF was
expressed by the USFS personnel interviewed as a continuum of responses ranging
from frustration to the perception of the abdication of authority on the part of the USFS.
The following quotation by one line officer
aptly illustrates this point, but it also hints at
the rationale for allowing such a practice:
I think that there is bitterness here there is a culture of experts in the Forest Service and I think you’ll find some
staff have attitudes that suggest we
give too much to the [collaborative
group], we give them too much power,
we let them make our decisions. If I go
ahead and make this one decision
based on what the collaborative group
wants, which may be different than
what is on the CAAF, I will hear about
it. There will be some employees who
say that I caved in. I tell a different
story about that. I don’t consider it caving at all. I consider it an investment in
something bigger than just that project.
I will visit with the staff about that how

they feel, but that is real difficult, especially when people go to school and
learn how to do silviculture prescriptions and do the right thing and then we
come in and compromise their integrity. As professionals, they see it that
way sometimes. We are asking them to
sell out on their profession for the [collaborative group].
These findings suggest that in the LMFRC
and the MVFC, the power of authority remains predominantly in the hands of the
USFS. Evidence suggests that in the NFRC,
however while no change is occurring in the
organization’s regulatory authority, the
agency is using its administrative discretion
to negotiate its decision space to include the
collaborative group in a substantial way.
When the leadership accepts pressure from
the collaborative group and effectively abdicates some measure of power to the collaborative group, agency personnel often become
frustrated that their authority and expertise
are questioned and often ignored.
Power of Resources
As Purdy (2012:410) notes, resources “include tangibles such as financial support,
people, technology, and supplies; as well as
intangibles such as knowledge, culture, and
capabilities.” The acquisition and allocation
of resources is a dynamic process and as
such, the application of power stemming
from resources is mutable. Interview participants from all three case studies mentioned
the importance of resources. Sharing
knowledge through the transfer of information and data was the most commonly reported resource mentioned by interviewees.
The USFS was founded on the premise that professional foresters, who had obtained specific scientific training in forestry,
would manage the nation’s trust forests
(Kaufman 1960; Tipple and Wellman 1991).
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Indeed, it is this professional knowledge and
the culture of expertise that has placed the
USFS in the position of having influence over
the citizens who rely on the forests for commodity extraction, recreation, and ecosystem
services. In the participant arena, three USFS
staff from the NFRC mentioned that sharing
knowledge with the collaborative group constituted much of the time and effort they put
forth in the collaborative relationship and that
they are sharing information and data that
they would not ordinarily share with the public. The level of information and data required by the collaborative group suggests
that the non-agency members of the group are
attempting to become experts in their own
right. The NFRC then uses this knowledge to
influence the decision-making process and as
such, the USFS is conveying a portion of its
power to the collaborative group in the
NFRC. While two USFS staff members from
the LMFRC and the MVFC noted that they
do share information with their respective
collaborative groups, comments by collaborative group members such as, “the USFS are
the experts, we rely on their expertise”, indicate that the USFS continues to hold its
power that is rooted in specialized knowledge
in these two case studies. By retaining expertise, the USFS keeps stakeholders from having the ability to make well-informed demands on the USFS, thereby restricting the
influence of the stakeholders in the decisionmaking process.
In the process arena, three participants from the LMFRC noted that the collaborative group has contributed to the funding
available to the USFS for restoration projects
through the stewardship contracting process.
Briefly, stewardship contracting provides a
mechanism for the USFS to work more
closely with local communities by using existing funding to hire local contractors for
forest management projects (Moseley and
Davis 2010). Prior to its involvement with the

collaborative group, the USFS did not frequently use the stewardship contracting process for restoration projects, due to, what one
USFS staff member called, “internal barriers.” These barriers included lack of support
for stewardship contracting from those in administrative positions. In this case, because
the collaborative group expressed their desire
to use stewardship contracting, the USFS began using it and was continuing to do so at
the time this research was conducted.
Three participants from the NFRC
also noted an increase in funding for projects
owing to the collaborative relationship. Nonagency members of the NFRC regularly
lobby in Washington D.C., which has affected local USFS budgets. According to one
USFS line officer, “I would say the constituents of the NFRC have a large impact on what
budgets and the amount we receive.”
In the content arena, one USFS staff
member from the NFRC implied that the nonagency collaborative group members controlled the avenue of communication by requiring meeting minutes to be approved by
the non-agency members before they are distributed. In discussing his role in the collaborative group the USFS staff member commented, “presently, anytime we have a meeting with them I am usually there to take notes
and then I send out those notes to the NFRC
for their approval.”
These
findings
suggest
that
knowledge is shared across all three case
studies, but that the dependence by the collaborative group on the USFS to provide information that the agency would otherwise
not share is most prevalent in the NFRC. The
data also suggest that in the LMFRC and the
NFRC, the USFS is benefiting from the collaborative governance arrangements by receiving increased funding. However, the
mechanisms the collaborative groups use to
obtain funding differ between the case studies. Finally, evidence from the NFRC suggests that the non-agency members of the
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group exert their power by controlling one
source of communication via the approval
and distribution of the meeting minutes.
Power of Discursive Legitimacy
According to Purdy (2012), those
wielding the power of discursive legitimacy
can display domineering behavior that may
restrict who has access to certain information
or with whom and how the collaborative process is discussed. Evidence of domineering
behavior was found only in the NFRC and
was mentioned by two participants. Falling in
both the participation and content arenas, one
USFS line officer noted that the agency and
representatives from the timber and conservation interests are paid for their work in the
collaboration by the organizations they represent. In the case of the NFRC, we found the
perception within the community that the fact
that the timber industry and conservation interests are paid allows the non-agency collaborative group members to dominate the direction of collaborative actions to that benefit
only their limited interests. The NFRC has
excluded other interests from joining the collaborative effort by its frequency and timing
of meetings. As such, the interests represented by the paid members of the collaborative group, representatives of the timber industry and conservation community, often
take priority over the interests of other publics from the community.
In the process area, one line officer
commented that because of the history of collaborative success and an on-going relationship between the stakeholders and the Secretary of Agriculture, the non-agency members
of the collaborative display an air of ‘righteousness’ when dealing with the USFS. The
following quote by a USFS line officer describes how the collaborative group controls
the collaborative conversation and sometimes displays domineering behavior.

The conversation we have with [collaborative group] is often rooted in
their ego. They think because they
have all of this wonderful history, that
they are world famous, and that the
secretary of Agriculture talks to them
– so USFS you need to do this our way
because we’re great. There’s this ego
thing going on with this, I’m sorry, but
it just isn’t flying well with me and I
think that it’s potentially dangerous. I
think that it keeps us stuck if we are not
careful. They have every reason to be
proud of their success, there is no question about that, but when it is used to
strong-arm us, something critical has
to change in the way we relate to them.
I want to honor the history of success
and all the work that they did to come
together, that is real and important, but
I want to change the nature of the conversation and I just don’t know how to.
Power of Trust
Interwoven into the power dynamics of all
collaborative relationships between the
stakeholder groups and the USFS is the
power of trust. Following the framework laid
out by Smith et al. (2013) an individual’s
trust in an agency is predicated on the belief
that the agency shares an individual’s values
and will act in a manner that results in the outcomes that are important to the individual.
Four USFS staff members from the NFRC
noted that they spend a significant amount of
time and effort in ‘justifying,’ to non-agency
members of the group, their recommendations for specific management prescriptions.
This finding suggests that mistrust exists between the agency and other stakeholders. The
non-agency members of the collaborative
group perceive that the agency’s priorities
and values are not shared with them (Smith et
al. 2013) or conversely, that they do not share
the same values and expectations as the
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agency.
One non-agency collaborative group
member from the NFRC summarized this
perception of the lack of alignment between
stakeholder values and agency actions leading to a lack of trust with the USFS in the following comment.
Hopefully, the upcoming workshop
will be similar to the one that we did
years ago and it will have us all talking
and building trust and relationships because we need that. A lot of things
came up and we thought they would be
addressed in this forest plan, but they
weren’t. In fact, all the collaboration
that had gone on, not only [collaborative group], but a lot of other stakeholders, was completely ignored in the
proposed action for the forest plan.
That was a reality check. It's like
wow…we thought we were in the line
with the Forest Service but really it
doesn’t look like we are.
In contrast, evidence was found in the
LMFRC that a concerted effort on the part of
the USFS to build trust with the collaborative
is underway, and that the agency’s actions are
in alignment with the priorities of the collaborative group. The following quote by one
USFS staff member summarizes this premise.

understood that we could still be effective with this project even if we
couldn’t treat [remove trees] in the
ROW list. And I also think that as a result of this coming together - one of my
objectives was - that if we could build
enough trust to get this one project
through, anybody could judge us based
on the product. And the idea was integrity. We will do what we said we will
do. We will not do what we said we
won’t do. We will have integrity in this
project.
It is clear from these two disparate examples
that trust is not necessarily a function of the
length of time a group has collaborated with
the USFS. The NFRC had been operational
for more years than the LMFRC, yet there is
an apparent lack of trust in the NFRC. Issues
of the power of trust did not emerge from data
collected from the MVFC. Within LMRRC
and the MVFC, the collaborative groups have
been able to avoid issues of trust through proactive and inclusive processes that include
the USFS acting on collaborative agreements
and sharing similar goals and values with
stakeholders. In fact, one USFS staff member
from the MVFC summed up his perception of
the role of power, including trust, in the collaborative effort by saying, “there are no
power struggles with this group.”
Discussion

We presented the data about the
proposed project and basically asked
[collaborative group] to consider this
data in light of the actions that we’re
proposing. And then we…we’re willing to listen to their proposals. We took
them seriously. For example, we know
that road list is a significant issue.
From the onset of the [proposed project] we immediately got into dialoguing and talking about the ROW [right
of way] list so, there wasn’t a fight. We

The results from this study indicate that, for
the three case studies examined herein, the
power dynamics at play within the collaborative governance arrangement include authority, resources, discursive legitimacy, and
trust. These powers, and the imbalance that
sometimes result from their application, are
representative of the underlying tensions that
can be present in collaborative governance
arrangements.
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At its best, collaborative governance
can provide solutions to complex and contentious natural resource problems through
power-sharing arrangements (Cestero 1999;
Dukes 2001; Scardina et al. 2007; Singleton
2002). It can lead to positive changes in the
organizational structure and processes of natural resource agencies and can result in getting more on-the-ground work completed
(Carr et al. 1998; Cheng and Burns 2007;
Leach et al. 2002; Selin and Chevez 1995;
Selin et al. 1997). Such is the case for the
LMFRC and the MVFC. The USFS office in
the LMFRC has seen an increase in their
funding through the ability to use stewardship contracting for restoration projects, an
organizational process not fully utilized by
the USFS prior to its engagement with the
collaborative group. Likewise, in the NFRC,
the USFS noted that they had experienced an
increase in funding through the lobbying efforts of the collaborative group.
Our findings also suggest that the application of power does not always lead to
beneficial actions (Purdy 2012). In the case
of the NFRC, when power imbalances occur,
authority is challenged, frustrations arise,
community and political relations are
strained, stakeholders are excluded, and trust
is difficult, if not impossible to maintain. In
essence, the very factors that are required for
an effective collaborative effort may be violated when one party within the collaborative
network exerts their power in ways that give
them advantage over other community interests (Cestero 1999; Cheng and Sturtevant
2012; Gerlak et al.; Schuett et al. 2001;
Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). Previous
studies that look at power in natural resource
decision-making are often theoretical in nature (Raik et al. 2008) or examine only a single case study (Cook 2015; Purdy 2012). Our
study is important in that it reveals that power
is applied in varying ways between case studies resulting in different realized and potential consequences.

As mentioned above, power associated with resources, beyond financial advantages, plays a predominant role in the
power dynamics between the agency and collaborative groups. The non-agency members
of the collaborative groups in the LMFRC
and the MVFC, acknowledge and accept the
USFS position as experts. In the NFRC, however, non-agency members of the collaborative group question the actions of agency personnel and are aiming to become experts in
their own right. Assuming the old adage that
knowledge is power, it would appear that the
NFRC is seeking to accumulate power by acquiring knowledge. However, contextual factors other than the quest for power could be
driving the NFRC’s desire to obtain specialized information and knowledge. Applying
Smith et al.’s (2012) framework, the requests
for specialized information from the agency
by the NFRC could stem from a concern that
the agency does not share the same values
and expectation of outcomes as the community stakeholders. The storied history of the
relationship between the agency and community members is rife with conflict. During the
Timber Wars, disputes over forest management often resulted in intensively strained relationships between the community and the
USFS and the community experienced harsh
economic downturns. While the collaborative
effort between the USFS and the NFRC has
resulted in a decrease in litigation and increased funding for restoration projects, the
wound from the aforementioned difficulties
has not completely healed. The economy of
the community in which the NFRC resides is
still timber-dependent and as the largest employer in the community, is influential in the
area. Many of the NFRC’s members are individuals who were involved in the earlier conflicts and their memory is long. Although the
community that encompasses the LMFRC
shares a similar, albeit less contentious history with the NFRC, the economy of the area
is no longer dependent upon timber and many
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of the timber operations in the area have
closed. A desire on the part of the non-agency
stakeholders to become ‘experts’ could also
be driven by other contextual factors. Timber
industry representatives make up a portion of
non-agency stakeholders in the NFRC. A
need to ensure that any treatments or plans
that the USFS executes meet timber industry
objectives could be a driving factor in the desire of some stakeholders to fully understand
USFS’s methodologies and the agency’s justifications of proposed actions. Even if the initial motivation in obtaining specialized information is not to gain power, the result of
doing so places the non-agency stakeholders
in the position of having knowledge, with
which they could exert power should they
chose to do so. A limitation of our research is
that we do not delve deeply into the antecedents of the power relationships at play, especially from the community’s perspective. A
future research direction that would prove
useful to collaboration scholars and practitioners alike is to elucidate the perceived motivations for the community stakeholder’s actions of information and data transfer.
An even more noteworthy finding of
this study is that power is unlikely to be applied independently as some sources of
power can be applied across more than one
arena and the sources themselves can be interwoven with other power sources. Such is
the case of the role of trust and the application
of power. It is apparent, in this study, that the
USFS in the NFRC is transferring a measure
of its decision-making power to the collaborative group beyond what would typically be
expected in a collaborative governance arrangement. This was not found to be the case
in the LMFRC and the MVFC.
In the NFRC, a tension between the
power of authority and the power of trust results in struggles over discursive legitimacy
across the arenas of participation, process design, and content. As Nie (2004) noted, the
U.S. Congress sets up this power dynamic

through its devolvement of oversight of the
agencies through the public involvement
mandate. It is through the community-level
collaboration that the power dynamic is manifested and the consequences are played out.
We see this reflected in the actions of a line
officer in the MVFC who asserts the USFS’s
authority by drawing a line in the sand when
it comes to decision-making, thereby making
the collaboration process more closely resemble the traditional public involvement
process. The NFRC, however, presents a very
different story. Even though the USFS possesses authoritative power, a lack of trust by
stakeholders, as seen in the NFRC, can undermine that power and open the space for
contests over participation, process, agendas,
and management actions. The consequence
of this tension is that the USFS personnel can
feel that their expertise and credibility are being threatened, and they react with negativity
and resistance to the collaborative effort that
only further increase the tension. In the
NFRC, even though there was some USFS
staff resistance at first, line officers seemed
open to the collaborative group’s involvement in defining management goals and actions, and the stakeholders themselves placed
trust in the USFS. However, the collaborative
group, because of its narrow stakeholder representation, has continued to exert its power
across boundaries and into areas that have
heretofore been the purview of agency personnel. It should be noted, however, that Rudeen et al. (2012) found that a full representation of interests in a collaborative effort did
not guarantee the avoidance of tensions over
power. Future research that further examines
the relationship between stakeholder representation and power relationships would improve the understanding and practice of collaboration in natural resource management.

POWER IN FOREST COLLABORATIVES

Conclusion
An intricate and dynamic process of jockeying for power and negotiating decision space
between the USFS and community stakeholders plays out in the collaborative governance of federal forests in the post-Timber
War American West. The level of trust between the stakeholders and the agency, and in
particular, the level of shared values and the
perception of the alignment of agency goals
and actions with the desires and expectations
of the collaborative group are key components of how power is distributed within the
collaborative relationship. As collaboration
becomes increasingly institutionalized as a
favored policy tool to address federal forest
management challenges, it is increasingly
likely that power dynamics will intensify
(Schultz; Jedd and Beam 2012). This places
a high burden on collaboration conveners and
facilitators to develop and sustain the capacity to address power dynamics through structured, transparent, and accountable processes. In turn, this necessitates an investment in collaborative capacity to match the
high expectations placed on locally-based
collaboration to address the complex and
still-contentious issues facing federal forests.
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